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The Business of Insurance: Exemption,
Exemption, Who Has The Antitrust
Exemption.
In 1890, Congress adopted the Sherman Act.' The statute was
designed to preclude the formation of monopolies and prevent the
abuse of economic power.2 Not until fifty years later, however, did
the insurance industry become subject to this antitrust act.3 In 1944,
the United States Supreme Court decided that insurance contracts af-
fected interstate commerce and were subject to federal law including
antitrust laws.
In 1945, however, Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act4
in response to concerns expressed by the insurance industry and several
states that the states would be precluded from regulating the insurance
industry.' The Act expressly reserved to the states the power to regulate
the insurance industry.6 The Act also granted the industry a limited
exemption from federal antitrust laws.7 Activity that could be
characterized as constituting the business of insurance was granted
this limited exemption.'
Struggling with the question of whether a given activity constituted
the business of insurance, lower courts initially construed the phrase
broadly.9 Recently, however, the Supreme Court narrowed the interpre-
tation of the phrase.'" The Court established a three-pronged test to
be applied whenever a party raises the McCarran-Ferguson Act as
a defense to an alleged antitrust violation."
The issue of whether an activity constitutes the business of insurance
has returned to the fora of the lower courts. The problem of judicial
1. 15 U.S.C. §§1-7.
2. See A. Thompson, Antitrust And The Health Care Provider 3 (1979).
3. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§1011-1015.
5. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
8. Id.
9. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 69-113 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
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interpretation, however, remains. Currently, courts are struggling with
an uncertain Supreme Court test, as illustrated by inconsistent applica-
tion of the test in federal courts of appeal.' 2
This author will analyze inconsistent lower federal court opinions
regarding the antitrust exemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act."3
A discussion of these lower court opinions in the wake of the current
Supreme Court test will provide a foundation for suggesting alternative
approaches for granting an antitrust exemption to the insurance
industry. Initial consideration will be given to the legislative intent
behind the McCarran-Ferguson Act."' In addition, this author will
illustrate the analysis recently adopted by the Supreme Court to resolve
the issue of whether activity of an insurance company constitutes the
business of insurance. 5
The problems lower courts are facing in light of the modern three-
pronged test then will be explored.' 6 Despite a narrowed interpretation
of the business of insurance, the McCarran-Ferguson exemption is
being applied inconsistently. Inconsistent application of the exemption
suggests the existence of confusion in the understanding of lower court
decisions. Without a clear understanding of the scope of the exemption,
lower courts are unable to advance the objective of all antitrust laws,
namely, the protection of consumer welfare through unrestrained
competition.
Finally, this author will propose alternatives to the current approach
taken by the Supreme Court.' The first alternative is an expansion
of the current three-pronged test.' 8 The addition of a fourth prong
that focuses the attention of courts on the welfare of the consumer
would ensure that the interests of consumers are being considered.
The second alternative to the current approach taken by the Court
is the legislative adoption of a list of exempted insurance activities.' 9
A list has the advantage of providing predictable results for insurance
companies that raise the McCarran-Ferguson Act as a defense to anti-
12. See infra notes 114-59 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 114-59 and accompanying text. A discussion of the entire McCarran-
Ferguson Act is beyond the scope of this comment. Discussion in this comment is limited to
interpretation of the term, "business of insurance," as contemplated within the meaning of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
14. See infra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 114-59 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 174-90 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
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trust litigation. A final alternative is to abandon completely the anti-
trust exemption for the insurance industry.2" Economic pressures that
spawned the adoption of the antitrust exemption may no longer exist.
Recent studies suggest that rather than a limited antitrust exemption
for insurance companies, unrestrained competition would be better
suited to modern economic conditions. 2' Promotion of unrestrained
competition is the purpose of the Sherman Act.22 Therefore, a discus-
sion of the Sherman Act and the Supreme Court opinions that brought
activities of insurance companies within the regulatory power of Con-
gress will be the starting point for exploring the antitrust exemption
for the business of insurance.
THE SHERMAN ACT
The first federal antitrust statute, known as the Sherman Act,
was adopted in 1890.23 The statute represented the culmination of
decades of effort to preclude the formation of monopolies and prevent
abuses of economic power that consumers had suffered at the hands
of the railroads, the Standard Oil Trust, and other economic giants.24
The statute declared illegal any agreement in restraint of trade or in-
terstate commerce .2 Activity subject to the statute had to be within
the power of Congress to regulate. Prior to 1944, the Supreme Court
consistently held that the insurance industry was not subject to federal
regulation.26 Since the industry was not subject to regulation, the
federal antitrust laws did not apply.
The leading decision on the issue of whether activities of insurance
companies were within the power of Congress to regulate was the
1868 case of Paul v. Virginia.27 In Paul, the Supreme Court held
that the commerce clause- of the United States Constitution did not
deprive the individual states of the power to regulate and tax specific
activities of foreign insurance companies selling policies within the
territories of the individual states. 28 The Court noted that an insurance
20. See infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 163-7d and accompanying text.
22. See 90 Cong. Rec. A4405 (1944).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§1-7.
24. See A. Thompson, Antitrust And The Health Care Provider 3 (1979).
25. 15 U.S.C. §1. Courts have emphasized that only unreasonable restraints are prohibited.
See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
26. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533, 543-44 (1943).
27. 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
28. Id. at 183.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
contract was a wholly intrastate transaction.29 The insurance industry,
therefore, did not affect interstate commerce" and was not subject
to the Sherman Act.
After seventy-five years, the Supreme Court departed from the Paul
rationale in the case of United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association." The Court noted that the insurance industry greatly
impacted upon the trade and commerce of our Nation.32 Activities
conducted across state lines, therefore, were not beyond the regulatory
power of Congress under the commerce clause.33 The Court also noted
that the interference with free competition with which the underwriters
were charged was exactly the conduct that the Sherman Act outlawed.34
The Court, therefore, held that the business of insurance affected inter-
state commerce and could be subjected to federal regulation, including
antitrust laws. 5
The majority opinion sparked widespread criticism.3 6 Some states
feared that they no longer could tax or regulate the insurance
industry. 7 Representatives of the insurance industry believed that the
states were in a better position to regulate the industry.3" The dissenters
in South-Eastern Underwriters did not object to the recognition of
congressional power to regulate the insurance industry; rather they
objected to the consequent loss of state authority to regulate the
industry.39 Congress responded quickly to the case and the criticism.
Within two years, the McCarran-Ferguson Act was adopted.
TI MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT
Congress responded to the decision of the Supreme Court in
South-Eastern Underwriters by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act
in 1945.40 In pertinent part, the Act provides that "the business of
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. 322 U.S. 533 (1943).
32. Id. at 539. "Perhaps no modern commercial enterprise directly affects so many persons
in all walks of life as does the insurance business." Id. at 540.
33. Id. at 553.
34. Id. at 536.
35. Id. at 553.
36. Anderson, Insurance And Antitrust Law: The McCarran-Ferguson Act And Beyond,
25 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 81, 85 (1983).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. South-Eastern, 322 U.S. 533, 562-63 (Stone, C. J., dissenting). Id. at 585 (Jackson,
J., dissenting in part).
40. Anderson, supra note 36, at 85-87.
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insurance . . shall be subject to the laws of the several States which
relate to the regulation or taxation of such business."' The Act ex-
pressly preserves state authority to tax and regulate the insurance
industry. 2 In addition, the Act protects state authority by providing
a limited exemption from federal antitrust law for the business of
insurance, but only to the extent that the activity is regulated by state
law. 43
The primary purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is to preserve
state regulation of insurance companies, as regulation of those activities
existed prior to the decision in South-Eastern Underwriters.14 A secon-
dary purpose of the Act is to grant an exemption from federal antitrust
laws to activities determined to constitute the business of insurance.4 5
Congress, however, did not intend to revive the blanket exclusion from
federal antitrust laws that the insurance industry enjoyed prior to the
South-Eastern Underwriters case.46 In addition, interpretation of the
Act supports the proposition that the business of insurance is exempt
from federal antitrust laws only if the activity is the type envisioned
by Congress. 47 A short review of the McCarran-Ferguson legislation
will provide some understanding of the intent of Congress in exempting
the business of insurance.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE EXEMPTION FROM ANTITRUST LAWS
FOR THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE
Immediately following the district court decision in South-Eastern
Underwriters, legislation was introduced in Congress that would have
exempted completely the insurance industry from the federal antitrust
laws.48 The proposed legislation provided that nothing in the federal
antitrust laws would be applied to the business of insurance.4 9 The
proposed legislation received limited support and eventually failed.5"
41. 15 U.S.C. §1012. The Act provides that the business of insurance is exempt from federal
regulation only to the extent that the activity is regulated by state law. Id. §1013.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 218 n.18 (1978).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 220. Unsuccessful attempts by members of Congress to enact a blanket exemption
illustrate this point. Id.
47. See 15 U.S.C. §1013(b).
48. 90 Cong. Rec. 6565 (1944); see Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 219.
49. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 219 n.19.
50. Id. at 219. The bills favoring total exemption failed because of an anticipated veto
by President Roosevelt. See 91 Cong. Rec. 1087 (1945) (remarks of Rep. Hancock). Moreover,
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Prior to the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) presented a report
to the United States Senate." The report concluded that the unrestricted
competition contemplated by the antitrust laws should not be applied
to the insurance industry. 2 The insurance commissioners were interested
more in preserving state regulation of the industry than in excluding
the industry from federal antitrust scrutiny.53 The recommendation
of the NAIC to the Senate concerned the promotion of intra-industry
cooperative activities and not cooperative activities that an insurance
company might engage in with others outside the insurance industry. 4
The recommendation was intended to place outside the scope of the
Sherman Act those activities regarded by Congress to be in the public
interest despite a technical violation of the antitrust laws. 5 Seven
specific practices to which the Sherman Act should not apply were
enumerated in the recommendation. 6 The McCarran-Ferguson Act,
however, was enacted without the specific list recommended by the
NAIC.
The legislation eventually enacted was introduced by Senators
McCarran and Ferguson. The bill represented a compromise between
those who favored full and immediate application of the antitrust laws
to the insurance industry and those who favored an absolute
exemption." The exemption for the business of insurance was not
intended to protect overly predatory conduct by insurers who wished
only a small segment of the insurance industry supported the legislation. See Weller, The
McCarran-Ferguson Act's Antitrust Exemption For Insurance: Language, History and Policy,
1978 Duica L.J. 587, 592 n.34.
51. 90 Cong. Rec. A4403-08 (1944). Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 221.
52. 90 Cong. Rec. A4405 (1944). The Commissioners stated that combined efforts for
statistical and rate-making purposes were necessary for smaller enterprises and insurers who
were unable to underwrite risks accurately. Id. The inability to underwrite risks accurately would
lead to eventual insolvency. Id.
53. See Weller, supra note 50, at 593.
54. See Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 222.
55. 90 Cong. Rec. A4407 (1944).
56. The proposal provided that the Sherman Act should not apply to: (1) any agreement
or concerted or cooperative action which prescribed the use of rates; (2) the use of those rates;
(3) any cooperative or joint service, adjustment, investigation, or inspection agreement relating
to insurance; (4) any agreement or concerted or cooperative action among two or more insurers
to insure, reinsure, or otherwise apportion the risks; (5) any agreement or concerted action
with respect to the payment of insurance agents or brokers; (6) any agreement or concerted
action with respect to the collection and use of statistics; and (7) any agreement or concerted
action providing for the cooperative making of insurance rates, rules, or plans. 90 Cong. Rec.
A4406 (1944). Although the proposed legislation was not enacted, the proposal is important
because the McCarran-Ferguson Act was based in large part upon the NAIC proposal. Royal
Drug, 440 U.S. at 221. An amended version of the McCarran-Ferguson bill deleted the list
of specific activities. Weller, supra note 50, at 596.
57. Anderson, supra note 36 at 86.
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to extinguish competition, but was intended to enable insurers to under-
write risks accurately through cooperative ratemaking practices.58 In
that way, the insurer would remain reliable and solvent for the benefit
of the insured.59
Unfortunately, Congress failed to provide a definition of the term
business of insurance. Thus, the stage was get for judicial interpreta-
tion. A review of significant Supreme Court decisions will illustrate
the problems the Court has faced due to judicial inability to define
adequately what constitutes the business of insurance.
DEFUNG BusNEss OF INSURANCE
In SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,6" the Supreme Court attempted
to define the business of insurance. The Court stated that Congress
was concerned with state regulation that focused on the insurance
contract.6 ' Although the exact scope of the statutory term was unclear,
the Court believed that the focus should be on the relationship between
the insurance company and the policyholder.62 Statutes regulating that
relationship, directly or indirectly, were laws regulating the business
of insurance. 61
Despite this seemingly workable standard, the exemption for the
business of insurance recently has come under increased scrutiny by
the Supreme Court. 6 This renewed interest largely is in response to
new approaches taken by insurers, particularly in the healthcare field,
to control rising claim costs.65 New approaches, such as third party
provider agreements, frequently reduce competition among insurers
58. 15 U.S.C. §1013(b). The exemption does not extend to predatory conduct arising fromboycott, coercion, or intimidation. Id., see KalIstrom, Health Care Cost Control By Third
Party Payors, 1978 DuKE L.J. 645, 684.
59. See 91 Cong. Rec. 1481 (1945). "[W]e cannot have open competition in fixing rates
on insurance. If we do, we shall have chaos. There will be failures, and failures always follow
losses." Id. (remarks of Senator Ferguson).
60. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
61. Id. at 460.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See infra notes 69-113 and accompanying text.
65. Anderson, supra note 36, at 82 n.3. Examples of these new approaches are "third
party provider agreements" and "peer review committees." Id. A third party provider agreementis an agreement between an insurance company and a provider of a good or a service. Id.
Although not a party to an insurance contract, the third party provider agrees to provide agood or service to a policyholder of the insurance company. Id. Peer review committees com-
monly are found in the chiropractic field. Id. The committee is hired to examine a chiroprac-
tor's statements, the fees charged, and to render an opinion regarding the necessity for the
treatments. Id. at 110.
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and, consequently, have been challenged under the federal antitrust
laws." In Group Life & Health Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,7 the Supreme
Court responded by formulating a test for determining whether an
activity was exempt from federal antitrust law."
ROYAL DRUG AND THIRD PARTY PROVIDERS
Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co. involved
an insurance company that offered policies entitling the insured to
obtain prescription drugs.69 The insured was allowed to obtain the
drugs from a pharmacy participating in the pharmacy agreement with
the insurance company.7" The agreement provided that if the policy-
holder purchased the drugs from a participating pharmacy, the policy-
holder paid only two dollars for every prescription drug, with the
remainder of the cost paid directly by the insurance company.7' The
insured also had the option of purchasing the drugs from a non-
participating pharmacy." If the insured purchased drugs from a non-
participating pharmacy, however, the insured paid full price and was
entitled to partial reimbursement from the insurance company.73
The insurance company in Royal Drug offered to enter into a third
party provider agreement with each licensed pharmacy in Texas.74 The
participating pharmacy agreed to furnish policyholders prescription
drugs at two dollars each, with the insurance company agreeing to
reimburse the pharmacy for the cost of acquiring the drug." The
Supreme Court noted that only pharmacies able to afford to distribute
the prescription drugs for less than the two dollar mark up could
participate profitably in the plan.7 6 Non-participating pharmacies
brought an antitrust action alleging that Group Life & Health Insurance
66. Id. at 109.
67. 440 U.S. 205 (1978).
68. See infra notes 69-113 and accompanying text.
69. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 209.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. "Suppose the usual and customary retail price for a quantity of Drug X charged
both by 'participating' Pharmacy A and 'non-participating' Pharmacy B is $10, and the wholesale
price (or acquisition cost) to both is $8. If an insured buys Drug X from Pharmacy A, the
insured pays $2. Pharmacy A receives $2 from the insured and $8 from Blue Shield, or $10.
If an insured buys Drug X from Pharmacy B, the insured pays Pharmacy B $10, and receives
$6 (75% of the difference between the retail price and $2) from Blue Shield. While Pharmacy
B receives the same as Pharmacy A, the insured must pay $4 for the drug and must take
steps to obtain reimbursement." Id. at 209 n.3 (quoting amicus curiae brief of the United States).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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Company and three participating pharmacies had violated Section 1
of the Sherman Act by entering into agreements fixing the retail prices
of drugs. 71
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants on
the ground that the challenged agreements were exempt from the
federal antitrust laws under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 78  The
Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari because of conflict among
the various circuit courts of appeals as to the scope of the McCarran-
Ferguson antitrust exemption. 79 Holding that third party provider
agreements did not constitute the business of insurance, the Court
found two factors to be important. The first factor related to spreading
the risk incurred by the insurance company, and the second factor
related to examination of the contract between the insurer and the
insured.
A. Spreading The Risk
The first factor the Court in Royal Drug found important was
whether the activity involved a spreading of the risk that the insurance
company assumed in return for the payment of the premium by the
policyholder.8 0 The Court distinguished the spreading of risk from
the reduction of risk." According to the majority, only the former
was exempted as the business of insurance under the Act.82 Spreading
of the risk was held to be the primary characteristic of an insurance
contract.8 3 The Court stated that the agreements between the insurance
company and the participating pharmacies only served to minimize
the costs that the insurance company incurred in fulfilling underwriting
obligations."
77. Id. at 207.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 208.
80. Id. at 211.
81. Id. at 211-15. Quoting from a House Report, the Court noted: "The theory of in-
surance is the distribution of risk according to hazard, experience, and the law of averages.
These factors are not within the control of insuring companies in the sense that the producer
or manufacturer may control cost factors." H.R. Rep. No. 873, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9(1943). See also S. Rep. No. 1112, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1944); 90 Cong. Rec. 6526 (1944)
(remarks of Rep. Hancock); Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 221. The Court also noted the congres-
sional recognition that insurance companies were not able to control costs as further evidence
that pharmacy agreements, solely designed to minimize costs, were not the business of insurance.
See Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 221 n.25.
82. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 212-15.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 213. The Court noted that the pharmacy agreement between Blue Shield and
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The Supreme Court also recognized that some provider agreements
were necessary for the existence of some health care plans.8" That
a provider agreement is necessary, however, does not guarantee that
a provider agreement constitutes the business of insurance.86 The Court
noted that the agreements may constitute sound business practices and
may benefit the policyholders in the form of lower premiums, but
this did not mean the agreements constituted the business of
insurance.87 Agreements between the insurer and a third party that
are designed solely to minimize costs do not involve risk spreading
and, therefore, are not the business of insurance.88 Reduction of the
amount of money an insurance company must pay a policyholder
reduces the liability of the company and, therefore, the risk.89 To
qualify as the business of insurance, however, the activity must spread
the risk of loss that the insurance company agreed to underwrite. 9
In addition, the Supreme Court found that the risk spreading activity
must relate to the contract between the insurance company and the
policyholder. 9
B. Contracts With Third Parties
The second factor the Royal Drug court found important was
whether the activity of the insurance company related to the contract
between the company and the policyholder. 92 Initially, the Court noted
that pharmacy agreements were separate contractual arrangements be-
tween the insurance company and the pharmacies. 93 Pharmacies were
engaged in the sale and distribution of goods and services other than
insurance. 94 To constitute the business of insurance, the Court held
the pharmacy effectively reduced the total amount that Blue Shield was obligated to pay to
policyholders. Id. at 214. The agreements enabled Blue Shield to minimize costs and maximize
profits. Id. The cost arrangements might be sound business practices and ultimately might benefit
the insured, although there is no guarantee that the cost saving would be passed on to tile
policy holder. Id. Still, those agreements are not the business of insurance. Id.
85. Id. at 213 n.9.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 214.
88. Id. at 221.
89. Id. at 214 n.12.
90. See id. at 211. "It is characteristic of insurance that a number of risks are accepted,
some of which involve losses, and that such losses are spread over all the risks so as to enable
the insurer to accept each risk at a slight fraction of the possible liability." I G. Couch,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §1.2(a) (1971).
91. See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
92. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 215.
93. Id. at 216.
94. Id.
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that the activity exempted under the McCarran-Ferguson Act must
be between the insurer and insured. 95
The insurance company argued that the pharmacy agreements so
closely affected the reliability, interpretation and enforcement of the
insurance contract, and so closely related to status as reliable insurers,
that the pharmacy agreements fell within the exemption." The Court,
however, rejected the broad interpretation urged by the petitioners. 9
The Court stated acceptance of that interpretation would permit every
business decision of an insurance company an exemption from federal
antitrust scrutiny.98 Consequently, the Supreme Court held that pro-
vider agreements could not be considered part of the business of
insurance. 9"
Finally, the Court noted that the narrow construction of antitrust
law exemptions was a well settled principle."'0 The Supreme Court
reiterated that the primary concern of Congress underlying the anti-
trust exemption of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was that cooperative
ratemaking efforts of insurance companies be exempted from antitrust
laws.'0 ' As the provider agreements involved parties wholly outside
the insurance industry who were not involved in ratemaking activities,
the provider agreements did not constitute activities that fell within
the meaning of the business of insurance.0 2
The Supreme Court in Royal Drug provided an innovative analysis
for lower courts. Within four years, however, the issue whether activity
of an insurance company constituted the business of insurance returned
to the Supreme Court.0 3 This time the Court clearly identified a three-
pronged test for determining what activity constituted the business
of insurance.
PIRENO AND PEER REVIEW COMMITTEES
In Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno,'°" the Supreme Court held
that the use of a professional association peer review committee' 5
95. Id. at 215.
96. Id. at 216.
97. Id. at 217.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 232-33.
100. Id. at 231.
101. Id. at 221.
102. Id. at 231.
103. See infra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
104. 102 S. Ct. 3002 (1982).
105. See supra note 65.
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by a health insurer did not constitute the business of insurance. '
The peer review committee was hired to examine a chiropractor's
statements, the fees charged, and to render an opinion as to the necessi-
ty of the treatments. 07 Citing Royal Drug, the Court identified three
relevant criteria to determine whether a particular practice qualified
as the business of insurance. The first criterion was whether the activity
played a part in spreading the risk of the insurance company.' 08 The
second criterion was whether the activity was between the insurance
company and the policyholder rather than the insurance company and
a third party. 09 The third criterion was whether the activity was limited
to parties within the insurance industry." 0 The Supreme Court stated
that none of these criterion necessarily was determinative and all would
be applied on a case by case basis."' Examining the arrangement with
respect to all the criteria, however, the Court concluded that the ar-
rangement was not part of the business of insurance."' Formulation
of the three-pronged test in both Pireno and in Royal Drug, to a
great extent, was based upon the legislative history of the exemption. 'I
Despite Supreme Court clarification regarding the scope of the
McCarran-Ferguson antitrust exemption, lower federal courts continue
to struggle to understand and implement the latest interpretation.
A CONTNUING STRUGGLE iN LOWER COURTS
In Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., ' I the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was presented with
the problem of applying the McCarran-Ferguson exemption in light
of the Supreme Court opinion in Royal Drug. Proctor involved a
suit against five automobile insurance companies brought by several
automobile repair shops." 5 The plaintiffs alleged that the insurance
companies had conspired to fix prices of automobile body damage
repair work in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. ' 6
The Court of Appeals conceded the current uncertainty of the
106. Pireno, 102 S. Ct. at 3009.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 3007-11.
114. 675 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
115. Id. at 310-12.
116. Id.
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business of insurance exemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act." 7
Nevertheless, the court held that the activity of the insurance com-
panies, artificially depressing the price of auto repair, constituted the
business of insurance."' The court relied upon other circuit court of
appeal opinions to formulate a rationale.11 9 After illustrating that circuit
courts differed widely in approach to defining the business of insur-
ance, the Proctor court found that the agreements were wholly intra-
industry, were similar to cooperative ratemaking, and, therefore, the
exemption was applicable.' 20
The problem with the Proctor decision is not that the three-pronged
test was misapplied. The problem lies in the fact that the Proctor
court was unable to apply the three-pronged test with any certainty.' 2'
The court in Proctor found the test difficult to interpret and difficult
to apply.'22
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also has experienced problems
applying the three-pronged test of the Supreme Court. In one case,
the circuit court advocated a narrow interpretation of all antitrust
exceptions.'23 In another case, however, the same court went to great
lengths to justify the exemption of a third party provider agreement.'2
The Supreme Court intended to provide a means to harmonize the
opinions of the various lower courts rather than perpetuate the
uncertainty. 2 5
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has acknowledged that the ex-
emption from federal antitrust laws for the business of insurance should
be construed narrowly. 2 6 United States v. Title Ins. Rating Bureau
of Arizona,'2 7 involved an alleged illegal combination among the
defendants.' 28 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had fixed the
prices of escrow services in violation of the Sherman Act.'2 9 Based
upon a factual analysis involving risk spreading, the court reasoned
117. Id. at 318-19.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 319-21.
120. Id. at 320-21. The court noted that this reasoning was in line with the rationale of
Royal Drug, which was based on legislative intent. Id. at 321.
121. Id. at 321.
122. Id. at 312.
123. See infra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 135-51 and accompanying text.
125. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 208.
126. United States v. Title Ins. Rating Bureau of Ariz., 700 F.2d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 1983).
127. 700 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1983).
128. Id. at 1249.
129. Id.
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that the escrow arrangement properly was characterized as a cost
reducer rather than a risk spreader.'30 The court implied, however,
that satisfaction of the other two prongs was unclear.' The court
of appeals never stated whether the agreement between the defendants
and the escrow service was related to the agreement between the insurer
and the insured. 132 In addition, the court never stated whether the
challenged activity was limited to entities within the insurance
industry.'" Nevertheless, the court held that the agreements did not
constitute the business of insurance for purposes of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act and therefore were subject to federal antitrust scrutiny.' 34
In a case decided at virtually the same time as Rating Bureau,
however, the Ninth Circuit held that provider agreements between a
health insurer and participating pharmacies were exempt from federal
antitrust scrutiny based on the McCarran-Ferguson Act.' 5 The case
of Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical v. Klamath Medical Service Bureau'3 6
involved an antitrust action brought against a healthcare provider that
offered prescription drug benefits available only at the pharmacy of
the third party provider.' 37 The facts of the case were almost identical
to those in Royal Drug.'38 The only relevant distinction between these
cases is that in Klamath-Lake, the health insurer purchased the phar-
macies some time after the health insurer began the drug benefit pro-
gram in agreement with the participating pharmacies.' 39 The
policyholders, then, were required to have their prescriptions filled
by the health insurer.'4 0
The Ninth Circuit determined that the provider agreements were
exempt from antitrust scrutiny.' The court reasoned that the
agreements between the insurer and the policyholder clearly were ex-
empt from federal antitrust scrutiny so, a fortiori, the provider
agreements were exempt.'4 2 The conclusion that agreements between
the insurance company and the policyholder were exempt under the
130. Id. at 1251.
131. See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
132. See id. at 1252.
133. Id. at 1251-52.
134. Id. at 1252.
135. See infra notes 136-51 and accompanying text.
136. 701 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1983).
137. Id. at 1279-80.
138. Compare id. -with supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text to note the factual similarity.
139. Klamath, 701 F.2d at 1280.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1286.
142. Id.
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McCarran-Ferguson Act was correct. In light of the rationale in Royal
Drug, however, the conclusion that the provider agreements also were
exempt was incorrect.
The Ninth Circuit Court noted that the Supreme Court in Royal
Drug did not exclude all health insurance contracts from the business
of insurance despite the fact that some of these contracts did not
constitute the type of insurance contemplated by the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.'43 The Ninth Circuit, however, was under the impression
that the exemption shielding the health insurer from antitrust scrutiny
also shielded the third party provider agreements.' 4 In light of the
factual similarity between Royal Drug and Klamath-Lake, however,
the results in these two cases should have been the same.
Despite facts distinguishing Klamath-Lake from Royal Drug, the
Ninth Circuit Court cannot justify exempting the provider agreements.
In Royal Drug, the Supreme Court addressed a factual situation similar
to Klamath-Lake. The Court remarked that even though an insurance
company acquires a chain of drug stores in an effort to lower the
cost of meeting underwriting obligations, the acquisition is unrelated
to the contract between the insurer and the insured.' 5 Any relationship
between the insurer and the insured is established when the contract
is formed.'4 6 Therefore, any acquisition by the insurance company
after the formation of the insurance policy is not exempt from federal
antitrust scrutiny.
In Klamath-Lake, the insurer acquired the drug stores in an effort
to lower costs of meeting underwriting obligations.' 7 The acquisition
was a perfect example of risk reduction that the Supreme Court charac-
terized as outside the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust exemp-
tion. The purpose of the exemption was not to provide an insurer
with the power to redilce competition. Thus, the acquisition of the
pharmacies should not have been characterized as the business of
insurance.
In addition, the Supreme Court has warned of the possible anti-
competitive consequences resulting from provider agreements.' 8 In
Royal Drug, the Court noted that the existence of third party pro-
vider agreements has resulted in rapid escalation of health care costs
143. See id; Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 230 n.37.
144. Klamath, 701 F.2d at 1286.
145. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 215.
146. See Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 216.
147. See Klamath, 701 F.2d at 1280.
148. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
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to the detriment of the consumer. "9 The Ninth Circuit noted the anti-
competitive impact of provider agreements but declined to take that
factor into account.' 50 From the foregoing cases,' the uncertainty
and inconsistency with which lower courts have approached the prob-
lem of deciding what the business of insurance actually is becomes
apparent.
Intercircuit conflict brought the issue before the Supreme Court
in Royal Drug.'52 After Royal Drug, but prior to Pireno, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia attempted to apply the three-
pronged test of Royal Drug.'53 The decisions of the Ninth Circuit
have been inconsistent with those of the Supreme Court. 54 The Ninth
Circuit adopted a narrow view of antitrust exemptions in one case,'5
yet went to great lengths in another case to extend the McCarran-
Ferguson antitrust exemption beyond the limits prescribed by the
Supreme Court. 5 6 Due to the continuing uncertainty of what activity
constitutes the business of insurance, the issue likely will be brought
before the United States Supreme Court again.
A close reading of both Royal Drug and Pireno suggests that the
broad standards previously established by courts for interpreting the
business of insurance exemption are no longer acceptable. 5 7 The proper
standards to be applied, however, are unclear. Lower federal courts
have failed to apply the Supreme Court test consistently.5 8 This failure
indicates that the three-pronged test does not supply lower courts with
sufficient guidance. In addition, the value of the antitrust exemption
recently has been questioned.' 59
149. See Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 232 n.40. "Recent studies have concluded that physicians
and other health care providers typically dominate the boards of directors of Blue Shield plans.
Thus, there is little incentive on the part of the Blue Shield to minimize costs, since it is in
the interest of the providers to set fee schedules at the highest possible level. This domination
of Blue Shield by providers is said to have resulted in rapid escalation of health care costs
to the detriment of consumers generally." Id.
150. See Klamath, 701 F.2d at 1280.
151. See supra notes 114-47 and accompanying text.
152. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 208, n.2.
153. See supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
154. Compare supra notes 114-47 and accompanying text with supra notes 69-113 and ac-
companying text to note the inconsistency.
155. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
156. Compare Rating Bureau, 700 F.2d 1247 with Klamath-Lake, 701 F.2d 1276.
157. Kennedy, The McCarran Act: A Limited "Business Of Insurance" Antitrust Exemp-
tion Made Ever Narrower-Three Recent Decisions, 18 FORUM 528, 538 (1982). Kennedy sug-
gests that the vitality of the business of insurance exemption is substantially stifled by uncer-
tainty in the industry. Id. He also suggests that continued viability of the exemption as a defensive
shield from vexatious litigation has been cast in doubt. Id.
158. See supra notes 114-47 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 160-73 and accompanying text.
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QUESTIONING THE NECESSITY OF THE EXEMPTION
The insurance industry has undergone significant change since the
enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945.160 The industry
no longer is dominated by tight cartels16 ' or uniform regulatory super-
vision of collective ratemaking activities. 16 2 The justification for anti-
trust immunity, therefore, must be evaluated in light of present
conditions.
In January 1977, the U.S. Department of Justice released a report
that analyzed the effects of the antitrust exemption on the insurance
industry.' 63 The report stated that full price competition,' 6 4 rather than
cooperative ratemaking,' 65 could provide an effective means of achiev-
ing reasonable prices and maximum efficiency in the sale and distribu-
tion of insurance.' 6 6 The report concluded both that the insurance
industry should be able to conduct business without any special exemp-
tion from federal antitrust laws and that an alternative scheme of
regulation without the McCarran-Ferguson exemption might be
desirable.16
7
In 1979, the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws
and Procedures released a report that considered the effectiveness of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 168 The report concluded that the broad
antitrust immunity embodied in the McCarran-Ferguson Act should
be repealed.' 69 The Commission recommended that narrowly drawn
legislation be enacted to establish the lawfulness of a limited number
of essential collective activities.
70
The recommendation of the Commission that a specific list of essen-
tial collective activities' 7' be exempt from the antitrust laws is in line
160. Kemp, Insurance And Competition, 17 IDAHO L. REv. 547, 548 (1981).
161. A cartel is a combination of producers joined together to control production of a
product and to obtain a monopoly in any particular industry. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY
195 (5th ed. 1979) (defining cartel).
162. Id.
163. U.S. Department of Justice, Report Of The Task Group On Antitrust Immunities (1979).
164. Full price competition is the effort of two or more parties, acting independently, to
secure the business of a third party by the offer of the most favorable terms. See BLACK'S
LAv DICTIONARY 257 (5th ed. 1979) (defining competition).
165. Cooperative ratemaking is the cooperative setting of premium rates by competing in-
surance companies. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1070 (5th ed. 1979) (defining price-fixing).
166. U.S. Department of Justice, Report Of The Task Group On Antitrust Immunities 30
(1977).
167. Id. at 30-31. The basic question considered by the study was whether the present ex-
emption of the business of insurance from antitrust laws has operated in the public interest.
Id. at 29.
168. U.S. National Commission For The Review Of Antitrust Laws And Procedures (1979).
169. Id. at 225.
170. Id.
171. Cooperative ratemaking is an example of a collective activity. See supra note 165.
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with the 1944 recommendation of the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners.'" These recommendations have been based upon
evaluations of fair competition, consumer welfare, and other fun-
damental policies behind the antitrust laws."' The recommended list,
however, would be beneficial for a more basic reason. A list would
provide insurance companies with an awareness of which anti-
competitive activities are exempted from antitrust scrutiny.
These criticisms suggest that the antitrust exemption for the business
of insurance is unsound. The problem of interpretation experienced
by lower federal courts despite efforts by the Supreme Court to clarify
the issue support this suggestion. Alternative approaches, therefore,
must be considered.
ALTERNATIVES To THE THREE-PRONGED TEST
The Supreme Court has identified three factors to consider when
deciding whether a given activity constitutes the business of
insurance.' The test, however, has not proved effective for lower
courts.'" The effectiveness has been impaired because lower courts
struggle to interpret the three-pronged test established by the Supreme
Court. The result is an uncertain application of an important antitrust
exemption.'76
In light of the struggle the lower courts now face, alternatives to
the three-pronged Supreme Court test must be explored. Considera-
tion should be focused upon the interests of the consumer, the primary
interests the antitrust laws are designed to protect. One possible alter-
native, a more restrictive interpretation of the current Supreme Court
test, would ensure that the consumer is protected from anticompetitive
forces. Another alternative is the enactment of a specific list of ex-
empted activities. Specific exemptions based upon the best interests
of the consumer would provide the courts, the insurance industry,
and the public with a practical framework. A final alternative that
must be considered is complete abandonment of the business of in-
surance exemption. A discussion of these three alternatives will be
the focus of the remainder of this comment.
172. See supra note 56.
173. See 90 Cong. Rec. A4405 (1944).
174. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 114-59 and accompanying text.
176. Id.
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A. Restricting the Three Prong Test
The three-pronged test developed in Royal Drug and Pireno was
an attempt by the Supreme Court to provide lower courts with a solu-
tion to the problem of determining what constitutes the business of
insurance for purposes of exemption from federal antitrust laws.' 77
The first prong requires that the activity must spread the risk that
the insurance company agrees to underwrite."" The second prong re-
quires that the activity must be between the insurance company and
the policyholder rather than between the insurance company and a
third party.'79 Finally, the third prong requires that the activity must
be limited to intra-industry activity.'80 Applying these three criteria,
courts are expected to determine with consistency whether a given
activity constitutes the business of insurance within the meaning of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act. As previously illustrated,' 8' that goal has
not been realized.
If courts were directed to consider an additional criterion, however,
future decisions may not be so inconsistent. A fourth prong that would
focus the reasoning of courts on the welfare of the consumer could
be added to the existing Supreme Court test.'8 2 Regardless of whether
a given activity satisfies the first three prongs of the test, final con-
sideration under the fourth prong should be whether exempting the
activity is in the best interest of the public. Consideration of that
factor would ensure that the primary purpose of the antitrust laws
would be advanced. Still, none of these criterion necessarily are deter-
minative and all should be applied on a case by case basis.
Addition of the public interest prong to the existing three-pronged
test also would mean that courts would consider the interests of the
public on a subjective level. Both parties to an action would be able
to present evidence as to whether the public would benefit from exemp-
tion of the activity. If the court is not satisfied that exemption would
be beneficial to the public, the activity would not be exempted. This
alternative must be considered, however, in conjunction with any
specific activities that Congress should decide to exempt statutorily.'83
177. See Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 208.
178. Pireno, 102 S. Ct. at 3009.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See supra notes 114-59 and accompanying text.
182. An example of this fourth prong is: Notwithstanding satisfaction of the first three
tests, if the given activity will not serve the best interests of the public, the activity is not exempt.
183. See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
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Consideration of all these factors would ensure that the public interest
has been considered before anticompetitive forces legally may exist.
B. Exempting Specific Activities
Another alternative to the Supreme Court test is the compilation
of a specific list of exempted activities. The difficulty in compiling
such a list, however, would stem from the extensive debate among
those concerned as to which activities should be exempt. The California
Legislature recently faced a similar problem.
In 1984, the California Legislature attempted to enact AB 707.184
AB 707 would have legalized the formation of combinations between
health insurers and providers of medical care.' According to the
language of AB 707, the purpose of the legislation was to ensure high
quality health care in the most efficient and cost effective manner.,8 6
Opposition to the bill was fueled to a great extent by factions in the
health care industry that wished to have their particular activity exempt
and opposed exemption of any other activity.8 7 In light of the possibili-
ty that the same concern may be raised at the federal level, Congress
should be careful not to focus on the interests of an industry. Rather,
Congress should focus on the interests of the consumer. Activity that
would improve only the economic position of a business through anti-
competition should not be exempt. Activity that would tend to lower
costs to the consumer, however, is the type of activity that should
be exempt. Consumer welfare must be the primary consideration.
The need for a list is great. The list would relieve courts of the
burdensome application of the current three-pronged test. In addi-
tion, the insurance industry would be provided with predictable results
if litigation results from the type of activity in which the insurance
company engages. Most importantly, however, the consumer would
be protected from undesirable anticompetitive forces in the
marketplace. Since the protection of consumer welfare is the primary
goal of the antitrust laws, a final alternative, that no exemption should
exist, must be considered.
184. Assembly Bill 707, 1983-84 Regular Session (proposed addition to add §16770 to the
Cal. Business and Professions Code; §1342.5 to the Cal. Health and Safety Code; §10133.6
to the Cal. Insurance Code).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See telephone conversation with Irene Ifhizaka, legislative assistant to Assemblyman
Phillip Isenberg (January 22, 1985) (notes on file at Pacific Law Journal).
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C. Repeal Of The Business Of Insurance Exemption
In 1977, the Department of Justice recommended a complete aban-
donment of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption for the business of
insurance.' 88 In 1979, the National Committee For The Review of
Antitrust Laws concluded that the exemption from antitrust laws for
the business of insurance should be repealed.' 8 9 Also, the Supreme
Court noted in Royal Drug that exemption of third party provider
agreements resulted in rapid escalation of health care costs.'90 Congress
cannot ignore the possibility, therefore, that the business of insurance
exemption is outdated and may no longer be in the best interest of
the public. Until Congress repeals the exemption, however, courts
should have the opportunity to determine in a relatively easy fashion
what the business of insurance is. Implementation by courts of a fourth
prong ensuring consideration of the public welfare would provide courts
with that opportunity until Congress can enact a specific list of ex-
empted activities or repeal the exemption entirely.
CONCLUSION
The federal antitrust exemption for the business of insurance as
provided in the McCarran-Ferguson Act has been the subject of much
litigation and controversy during the past few decades. In early stages
of judical decision-making, the exemption was interpreted expansively
by lower courts. As the case law developed in the Supreme Court,
however, interpretation of the business of insurance narrowed. A
three-pronged test was established by the Supreme Court to guide lower
courts in resolving the issue of whether an activity of an insurer con-
stituted the business of insurance as contemplated in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.
The three-pronged test, however, has proven less than adequate
as a guide for lower courts. Evidence of this conclusion is found by
examining the decisions of lower courts following the establishment
of the three-pronged test. Lower courts are still struggling with the
issue, and application of the Supreme Court test remains uncertain.
This author has pointed to the relevant policies behind the
McCarran-Ferguson antitrust exemption for the business of insurance.
188. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
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The business of insurance exemption, as applied by courts since the
establishment of the three-pronged test, was analyzed. By illustrating
the uncertainty that lower federal courts have experienced in apply-
ing the latest test, this author has shown the need for an alternative
to the test devised by the Supreme Court.
Three alternatives to the Supreme Court test were suggested. The
first alternative was the addition of a fourth prong to the existing
three-pronged test. Under this fourth prong, when a court is deciding
whether an activity constitutes the business of insurance, the court
would consider whether exemption is in the public interest. This alterna-
tive has the advantage of providing the lower courts with a more
definitive test than that which currently exists. In addition, this alter-
native advances the welfare of the consumer, the main policy sup-
porting American antitrust law.
The second alternative proposed was the formulation of a specific
list of exempted activities. Congress should focus primarily on activi-
ties that would benefit the consumer despite the anticompetitive
character of the activity. This alternative has the advantage of pro-
viding courts with a specific list rather than a nebulous test.
Finally, evaluation of the business of insurance exemption is not
complete until one considers the need for the exemption at all. Some
authority suggests that the exemption is outdated and should be com-
pletely abandoned. This author believes, however, that complete aban-
donment is too severe. The insurance industry is not so stagnant that
previously unconsidered activity might not be in need of exemption.
Until Congress does repeal the exemption, however, courts need
a workable standard for deciding cases. In light of that need, Con-
gress should adopt a specific list of exempted activities. Until a list
is adopted, however, courts should apply a fourth prong to the exist-
ing Supreme Court test for determining what constitutes the business
of insurance.
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